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Masculine / Feminine

The concept of matter in Leone Ebreo's *Dialoghi d'amore* or the difficult question: who's on top.1

In this essay, I examine certain concepts of *materia* that Leone Ebreo used in his *Dialoghi d'amore*, which may be described as a Renaissance re-statement of Platonism from a particularly Jewish point of view. I combine this history of ideas topic with a related aspect, namely how gendered metaphors are employed to describe the physical aspect of the world. Since its beginnings in Classical Greece, there is a strong tendency in European philosophy to link discourses on the body, and the physical world in general, to discourses about women. The *Dialoghi* provide us with a rich ground for an investigation of the interrelations between concepts on the female body on the one hand and ideas on the origin of the world on the other; Leone Ebreo stages these relationships in the form of a conversation between an ardent male lover (Filone) and the reluctant female object of his desire (Sofia). In the *Dialoghi* metaphysics becomes akin to philosophical anthropology: that is to say that an ostensibly abstract philosophical discourse on the order of the world shapes a normative theory on the relationship between men and women and vice versa. Both aspects, abstract discourse as well as philosophical anthropology relate to a Rabbinical Jewish (as opposed to a Christian) discursive formation according to which the body is not necessarily inferior to the mind. For a Renaissance treatise on love, this is quite surprising; in the Christian tradition of that genre, the body is normally clearly inferior to the soul and the intellect. I believe that Leone Ebreo consciously subverts the Christian tradition by investing the body with a positive significance. In this context a quotation by Boyarin is to the point:

[... ] rabbinic Judaism invested significance in the body which in the other formations [Christian or Jewish] was invested in the soul. That is, for rabbinic Jews, the human being was defined as a body – animated, to be sure, by a

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1 Intellectually this essay is most indebted to the work of Theodore A. Perry, *Erotic Spirituality*, Alabama 1986, as well as to Daniel Boyarin, *Carnal Israel, Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture*, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1993. I wish to thank Barbara Garvin and Klaus Reichert for their editing, proof reading and comments.
Eyes wide shut

Early modern imagination, demonology, and the visual arts

It is commonly asserted that in the early modern period in Europe sight was the most privileged of the senses. The rise of empiricism in the sciences, philosophical deliberations on the workings and powers of vision, new technologies that offered the means to refine and amplify the sense of sight: these are among the conditions adduced in accounts of the status of ocularity in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries in particular. As commonly as it was celebrated among its sibling senses, sight was also disparaged, questioned, doubted. The dual status of sight and vision is reflected in the history of physical images, of art. Fiery questions arose in the sixteenth century, in the context of the Protestant Reformation, about the status of images. In the context of devotional culture, images were as variably evaluated as the sense of sight on which their powers depended.

This paper investigates a closely related issue – namely, the status in the early modern era of imagination, an internal sense frequently directly associated with the sense of sight. In what follows, I survey a selection of early modern ideas about the human imagination that emerged in philosophical, scientific, artistic, medical, and demonological contexts alike. The functional and dysfunctional relations between sight and mind figure prominently in early modern considerations on the nature of what one saw with eyes shut. And these relations between sight and mind impinge, in turn, on visual representation. One of the loci of vivid discussions of the powers of the imagination, discussions that resonate with contemporary images, is early modern demonology. The strikingly and largely unstudied correspondences between various early modern discourses – medico-philosophical, socio-political, demonological, and artistic – of the imagination comprise an art historical blind spot, which this paper investigates. Where art history lays claims to the history of images, it needs also to take into account, and to account for, the long history of those images seen with closed eyes, the products of the imagination.

It may be useful to offer at the outset a rudimentary account of classical and post-classical theories of the imagination and of its counterpart/synonym, phantasia. Early modern medico-philosophical and artistic theories of the workings of the imagination depended, often explicitly, on the classical heritage. In Platonic usage, the term phantasia refers to appearances in general, and mental representation in particular; phantasmata are construed either as images produced by the realm of the senses for the purposes of the mind, or as visions, or as both. In general, Platonic philosophy distinguishes between two kinds of imitation: the ekstatic and the phantastic. Imitative likenesses represent forms and are ekstatic; paintings of such forms, however, belong to the realm of phantasmata. In other words, phantastic images are not anchored in actual forms. This, then, is what makes them illusory and, to Platonic thinking, untrustworthy. For Plato, phantasia is not a particularly elevated mental function, and no great amount of time is spent analyzing its function; but it is bound up with a theory of representation that had considerable influence on the fine arts.

6 Ibid., p. 29.
The image-based (in Platonic terms, illusory) nature of phantasia is also fundamental to Aristotelian formulations, which predominate in the middle ages and well into the early modern period. Recall Aristotle's fiercely resilient proclamation in *De Anima* that "the soul never thinks without a phantasm." Phantasms are the images (or image-like entities) on which thinking depends. Here as in later, medieval considerations, the phantasia is the domain of images deployed by and stored in the mind. Aristotle is hardly specific about the domain per se; later commentators will delineate the province of the imagination and the nature of its products in greater detail. Thomas Aquinas, for example, declares that: "It is beyond the nature of the soul to understand without conversion [of sense impressions] to phantasmata." Here, as in his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*, he echoes the philosopher. Aquinas, following on Aristotle as well as Avicenna and Averroes, also distinguishes between two roles played by phantasia (or its Latin synonym, imaginatio). On the one hand, it "serves as a kind of storehouse for forms received through the senses," which is to say that it is a filter and receptacle, housing the images it produces out of sensory perception. On the other hand, phantasia combines records of sensory perception and, in the case of chimera, for example, may produce mental images of non-existent entities. More vivid mapping of the mental arena leads to further specification of the location and role of imaginative powers: Galen and various post-classical and Arabic medical authors consistently identify the anterior ventricle of the brain as the Phantastikon. As notions of the "internal senses" become more specific, so too phantasia comes to inhabit a specific location and assume a particular role within faculty psychology: sense perception is related to the soul by way of the sensus communis or sensus interior, a mediating apparatus fueled by phantasia. On such models, the Phantastikon is connected to the Dianoeticikon (the locus of reason), which in turn is connected to the Mnemonoeutikon (memory). Sensory data, transferred into images the mind can process, moves through the ventricles toward storage in the memory. When memory is activated, or when one dreams, these images are brought out of storage, as it were, and perceived again by the mind's eye. In general, imagination is counted as one of the internal senses — along with common sense, reason, cognition, judgment, and memory — that are fitted out to process data supplied to the mind by the external senses. Whether identified as imaginatio or phantasia (and sometimes both were present) what is represented is the faculty of mind responsible for producing the images on which the workings of the mind depend.

The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes' views on the imagination are rarely featured in accounts of seventeenth-century English political theory and virtually absent from the art historical record — although it should be recalled that Hobbes wrote three treatises on optics, a subject that informed much of his natural philosophy. The second chapter of his greatest work, *Leviathan* (1651) is devoted to the imagination, construed principally as an image-producing faculty of mind and briefly as the locus of witchcraft; he returns to the matter later in the text as well. Indeed, Hobbes' views partake of a longstanding discussion of the role and powers of the imagination, with significant bearing on the visual arts. The opening chapter of *Leviathan* is "Of Sense" and Chapter 2 of the First Part is "Of Imagination." This makes a certain amount of sense, both from the perspective of classical and scholastic theories of the mind, which treat imagination as one of the primary internal senses, and from the perspective of the psychological interest of much early modern political philosophy. It is not unusual that Hobbes introduces his political philosophy by way of a discussion of psychology; and even less unusual for such a discussion to move from the realm of the senses to imagination and memory, as Hobbes does. Moreover, the contours of Hobbes' theory of perception and mental functioning are entirely in keeping with longstanding models. Chapter 1, "Of Sense," lays the groundwork for his definition of how the mind digests what it experiences, by way of the

8 "Intelleigere sine conversione ad phantasmata est (animae) praeceptor naturae." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Part 1, q. 93, a. 1.
11 Wolston (as in note 4); Pegel (as in note 4), p. 98.
senses. "Of Imagination" treats the way in which sense perception is processed. Imagine we observe an object. "After the object is removed," writes Hobbes,

or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latines call imagination, from the image made in seeing. ... the Greeks call it fancy; which signifies appearance. ... IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but decaying sense, and is found in men, and many other living Creatures, as well sleeping, as waking [emphasis original].

Imagination is the (distinctly visual) processing mechanism that allows sense perception ultimately to be filtered (albeit, according to Hobbes, in decayed form) to memory. Hobbes also speaks of "simple" and "compounded" imagination; the former involves perception of a thing once seen and the latter the generation of fictitious, combined things, such as centaurs.

Hobbes' primary concern would appear to be the resistance imagination is capable of inspiring or mustering toward civil obedience, and the integrity of the Commonwealth. And precisely because his aim is to align man and his faculties with the workings of the state, Hobbes devotes considerable attention to the pernicious manipulations of imagination, as well as to common misunderstandings of its function. These misunderstandings are acute in the distinction between dreams and perception; giving credence to what is produced by agitation or deter aper in the imagination is dangerous and potentially subversive.

From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies, from Vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawns, Nymhs, and the like; and now adays the opinion that rude people have of Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins, and of the power of Witches.

Among the popular and misleading notions about the workings of the imagination, Hobbes means to correct are: "that Imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause" and "that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man, by God, and Evill ones by the Divell." Control over the faculties hinges on control over imagination, and faulty attribution of agency amounts to a threat to social order in Leviathan. For Hobbes, misconstruing the agency of imagination may result in political discord; as the locus of perception and of belief, this crucial mental mechanism has distinct social meaning. The handmaiden of sense perception, it has the power to lead the faculties (and with them the political

subject) astray. Hobbes' remarks on the imagination include the following additional gloss:

An IMAGE (in the most strict signification of the word) is the Ressemblance of some thing visible: In which sense the Phantastical Formes, Apparitions, or Seemings of visible Bodies to the Sight, are only images. ... They also are called PHANTASMES, which is in the same language, Apparitions. And from these Images it is that one of the faculties of mans Nature, is called the Imagination.

The source of these comments, Chapter 45 of Leviathan, contains a fascinating series of remarks on the relationship between the internal and external senses. Indeed, the chapter opens with a disquisition on the organs of sight. It may come as a surprise that the quoted commentary on images occurs under the rubric of "Demonology and other relics of the religion of the gentiles", but it is the case, as Hobbes' earlier comments suggest as well, that the imagination accommodated, at worst, the most deceptive phantasms of all -- demonic illusions.

That phantasia or imagination, lodged between the senses and memory or mind or the soul, processes perception was long held to be the case -- although individual accounts differed in their details. Throughout the extensive history of such conceptions of mental function, what remained stable was the status of phantasmata as (mental) images. Even Socrates claims that he was only citing an older molder when, in Plato's Theaetetus, he likens the impression of images in the mind to the imprinting of seals in wax. The image-based model of cognition is fundamental.

For the purposes of the present account, it is important to note that the early modern period witnesses a new variation on this model, in the sense that visual artists lay claim to the mental faculty long associated with standard cognitive operations as their special province. As Martin Kemp and David Summers have shown, the term "phantasia" came to be deployed in writing on the visual arts by the late fourteenth century. Leonardo, Michelangelo, and Dürer, to name only the pillars of the artistic community, took recourse to and engaged, to the point of transforming, an extensive and venerable history of considerations on phantasia.

16 Ibid., p. 89.
17 Ibid., p. 97.
18 Ibid., p. 93.
19 Ibid., p. 668
20 See Clark (as in note 9).
In a number of cases, new patterns of thinking about mental faculties and the role of imagination within them are expressed in images as well. Gregor Reisch's 1503 encyclopedia, *Margarita philosophica*, contains a pictorial diagram of how sense perception and the mind operate (fig. 1). This woodcut is but one early modern cognitive map that accounts for the role and locus of imagination. Four of the senses (those located in the head) are linked to their internal meeting place, the *sensus communis* - the common room of the senses. The simple lines with which the organs of external sense are connected with the initial ventricle establish a directionality. That which enters the common *sensorium* moves from the realm of *phantasia* and *imaginativa* to the space of cogitation and estimation. Its movement - communication between the ventricles - is aided by the valve marked *venmis*. The final ventricle accommodates memory. Reisch's image, like others of its time, illustrates the association of *phantasia* with *imaginativa* in early modern thinking about mental function - both are located in the first ventricle of the mind. The implication may well be that one is productive and the other passive, so that one is simply the sensory receptor and the other capable of producing compound *phantasms*. In any event, it is not always the case that the two, where both are in play, are conjoined so directly.

In an early woodcut by Albrecht Dürer, for example, the two faculties are distinct (fig. 2). This image is one of three illustrations in the Trilogium animae, the *Three Parts of the Soul*, by Ludwig of Prussia (Ludovicus Prutenus), which was published by Dürer's godfather Anton Koberger in 1498. The fat furrowed face depicted belonged to Dürer's close friend Willibald Pirckheimer, the humanist scholar and Nuremberg patrician, onto whom medieval faculty psychology has been mapped. In his brow, as explicated in a key in the margin of the image, Pirckheimer possesses all of the components of a functioning mind.

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25 That this diagrammatic view in profile became a standard model is clear from a French version in Guillaume le Liévre's *Ars memorativa*, published in Paris in 1520: see Guillaume le Liévre, *Ars memorativa Guilelmi Leopoli aulioane*, Paris, 1520, fol. 47.

26 Ludovicus Prutenus (Ludwig of Prussia), *Trilogium animae*, Nuremberg 1498, fol. E. See, most recently, the fascinating and well-documented exhibit, *Writing on Hands. Memory and Knowledge in Early Modern Europe*, Trout Gallery, Dickinson College, 2000, where this woodcut is discussed at cat. no. 26.
denotes the whole brain (*Cerebrum per totum*); *B* and *C*, contained in the foremost cell or capsule, are the common sense and imagination (*sensus communitiis* and *imaginatio*); *D* and *E*, conjoined in the center of the mind – conventionally the warmest, most productive region – are *fantasia* and the estimative faculty (*estimativa*). *F*, relatively expansive as well as cold on account of its position, is memory (*memoria*), which provides storage for the products of sense perception and the mind. Dürrer’s woodcut adheres to a tradition of representations – both visual and verbal – of the relation between the internal and external senses and, more specifically, the mechanism by which the mind senses, perceives, metabolizes, reproduces, and stores the objects of its experience. It is one of many maps of the perceiving mind, complete with the standard localization of its functions. It is also one of several early modern records of a shift in the positioning of *phantasia* and imagination. In an engraved synoptic table of the microcosm-macrocosm by Theodor Galle (1598), the same new relation between the two mental functions holds (fig. 3).27 Here, the internal senses are listed as *Sensus* *Comunitis*, *Imaginativa*, *Phantasia*, *Estimativa*, and *Memoria*. The microcosm-gentleman is fitted out with the spherical cells of the mental faculties or internal senses and supplemented by the *virtus motiva* – located, according to the annotations, in the farthest regions of the mind and in the spinal medulla, and responsible for actions of the body. Like Dürrer’s woodcut, Galle’s print localizes and visualizes the operations of the mind in an important new way: two imaginative faculties actively coexist.

In Dürrer’s portrait-diagram as in Galle’s version of a widely popular sixteenth-century encyclopedic image, imagination and *phantasia* are located in distinct cells (also called ventricles). Imagination is allied with the *sensus communis*, suggesting that it converts sense impressions into images the mind can comprehend. What, then, is *phantasia* doing, aligned or adjoined with the cogitative faculty? A more radical statement of the redistribution of labor or reallocation of faculties is proposed in a drawing by Leonardo, one of several drawings thought to constitute the preliminary stages of a book *On the Human Body* (circa 1490) (fig. 4).28 This profile view charts the contents of the brain, its similarity to an onion suggested by the small vegetable at the left of the sheet. At the center of the brain are three ventricles that, in Leonardo’s description, comprise the collective seat of the various mental functions. Their organization is unusual.

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27 Galle’s print is a bootleg copy of a work designed by Andrea Bacci, Professor of Botany at La Sapienza in Rome and first published in 1580; it was quickly copied in the north, published by Huybrechts in Antwerp in 1585 and Galle in the same city eleven years later. See exhibit. cat. *Writing on Details* (as in note 26), cat. no. 58.


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Fig. 3: Theodor Galle after Natale Bonifacio, *A Synoptic Table of the Microcosm-Macrocosm Analogy*, engraving (detail); whole image 61 x 42.6 cm, 1596

The first ventricle is the locus of the *impressiva* (recipient of impressions) and the third contains, entirely conventionally, memory. The middle ventricle is a veritable hub of activity: it accommodates the *sensus communis*, the *fantasia*, the intellect, and judgment. As Martin Kemp has pointed out, «The major innovation in all this is the shared habitation of *fantasia* and *intelecto* in the central cavity, a rearrangement which is profoundly associated with the conception of artistic imagination.»29 What is also truly distinctive about Leonardo’s model – the diagonal lines trace this aspect – is that it gives the impression that only visual impressions pass through the *impressiva*. (In the section view at the lower right of the sheet, though, it becomes clear that Leonardo allows for the passage of aura impressions via the *impressiva* and thus, perhaps, of other impressions as well; they might be conveyed by the membrane that loops around the brain and eye.) The most radical aspect of Leonardo’s drawing lies in its association of the

29 Kemp, Leonardo (as in note 22), p. 127. Note, however, that in some cases, as in a fourteenth-century German medical manuscript in the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in München or in G. de Harderwijck’s *Epimata* of 1496, the imaginative and *phantastic* faculties of mind are distinct and housed separately in connected compartments. See Park (as is note 21).
ventricles directly with the eye: the eye communicates, via the mechanism of the \textit{impressivus}, with the mind. For quite some time, the mind's medium had been visual (it needed images to think); here, very clearly for perhaps the first time, the mind's engine is the eye (the starting point is the visual organ).

Leonardo’s relocation of \textit{fantasia} announces – as do Dürer’s woodcut and Galle’s engraving – a conception of it as a productive mechanism, capable of making images for more than cold storage in the memory. The relation between \textit{phantasia} and artistic production is suggested by both Plato and Aristotle: Plato writes in \textit{The Republic} that the painter imitates a \textit{phantasm} and, in turn, produces \textit{phantasmata}, and both Aristotle and Plato revert to the metaphor of sense "paintings on the soul." But it is not until the early modern period that the powers and the products of artistic imagination came to be celebrated enthusiastically, and that an active \textit{phantasia} was deemed necessary for artistic creation. Cennino Cennini, circa 1400, used the word \textit{fantasia} to describe the natural (and necessary) mental equipment of a painter; he also speaks of its role in generating compound images, or images of things out of existing, observable matter, which in turn defy reality. While \textit{phantasia} per se was construed as a passive medium of transfer of sensory data into mental imagery, combinatory \textit{phantasia} produces mental pictures that do not relate to a perceptual reality, by associating otherwise distinct entities. The components combinatory \textit{phantasia} conjoins – most famously, in Horace's negative example of combinatory fantasy, the head of a man, a horse's neck, feathers, and a variety of limbs – are all derived from the material world, but their combination exceeds material reality. The notion of combinatory \textit{phantasia} is not, it is worth underlining, new to the early modern period. Augustine, Aquinas, and countless followers mention it: Bernard of Clairvaux is famously and vociferously disturbed by it. In the early modern period, however, it comes to be toured and its dangers assessed anew. Painting, wrote Cennini, "demands fantasy and skill of hand, to find things not seen, seeking them beneath the shadows of the natural, and fixing them with the hand, showing that which is not, to be." Cennini stakes his claim on a reversal of Horace’s negative example, which Leonardo would in turn take even further. Cennini writes that "The freedom is given the painter to compose a figure upright, seated, half horse, as it pleases him, according to his fancy." Leonardo advises that "If you wish to make an animal invented by you appear natural, let us say a dragon, take for the head that of a mastiff or hound, for the eyes a cat, and for the ears a porcupine, and for the nose a greyhound, and the brows of a lion, the temple of an old cock, the neck of a terrapin." In so doing, he announces a new valuation of combinatory (artistic) \textit{phantasia}.

30 Summers (as in note 22), p. 105, n. 9.
32 See the excellent discussion by Summers (as in note 22), pp. 128 ff; recently, on Bernard, see Thomas E.A. Dale, "Monsters, Corporeal Deformities, and Phantasms in the Cloister of St-Michel-de-Cuxa", in: \textit{Art Bulletin} LXXXIII (2001), pp. 402-436.
33 Cennini (as in note 31), chapter 1.
Witchcraft and fantasia

Such things as we being bewitched doo imagine, have no truth at all either of action or essence, beside the bare imagination.

Reginald Scot, *Discoverie of Witchcraft*35

Hobbes mentions witchcraft in his comments on the imagination; we turn now to the relation between representations of witchcraft and early modern conceptions of *phantasia*. Leonardo’s recommendations for producing a «natural chimera» lead us, perhaps unexpectedly, to the relationship between witchcraft and the imagination—a subject this article can only treat briefly. It is an infrequently remarked fact that early modern demonological literature is saturated with descriptions of the effects of witchcraft as fantastic, where witchcraft is construed as dependent on images produced by and/or in the imagination. From the later sixteenth century on, skeptical views of witchcraft argued that women who were believed or believed themselves to be witches were merely ‘the pathetic instruments of their own imaginations, which were either woefully dysfunctional (causing delusions) or manipulated by the devil. In his *De praestigiis daemonum*, first printed in 1563 and published in its final, revised form in 1583, the Rhineland physician Jan Wier writes of how

poor feeble-minded, bewitched, and idle women ... falsely believe ... that they themselves have done all the things that [the devil] puts into their imagination ... or all the mocking illusions that he presents to their view by means of his trickery. [Whereas in fact] all of these things are known to them only through phantasms or dreams.36

The faculty of imagination plays a consistent and constitutive role in early modern debates about witchcraft. Considerations on images and sight, broadly defined, formed a lynchpin in the ongoing discussion. Although it is alluded to in the historical literature, the relation between witchcraft and *phantasia* is the subject of only one sustained study—Ioan Couliano’s *Eros and Magic in the Renaissance*.37 Certainly, this is a crucial site for investigation of the history (and the power) of images.38 A widely underestimated link between signs of witchcraft and symptoms of melancholy is declared by a constellation of relevant authors in the later sixteenth century. Not only does analysis of artistic interest in witchcraft imagery need to take into account the relations between theories of the imagination common to both demonology and to art literature; the perversion of the imagination by sorcery would have been readily comprehensible to artists familiar with contemporary ideas about the pathology of melancholy. My analysis of the phenomenon, here and in more expanded form, is intended to reposition the representation of witchcraft alongside a mode of thinking about sorcery that—even where it opens on to the semi-pornographic or takes socio-political positions—actively investigates the human faculty of imagination, or our ability to see with our eyes closed.39 Writing in 1612, the French jurist Pierre de Lancre posited that:

Whether the transport of Witches to the Sabbath is a trick, dream, or illusion of the Devil, or whether they do travel there, really and corporeally, is a question so disputed by Doctors both ancient and modern, and by the reigning Judges of the parliamentary Courts, that it seems to me one can hardly doubt it.40

Nocturnal transvection was the aspect of sorcery most commonly explained—though not always explained away—as an effect of the imagination. As early as the tenth century, this «event» had been contradicted, in a widely influential manual of ecclesiastical discipline. The text was codified in the twelfth century, and has come to be known as the *Canon (Capitulum) Episcopi* (the discussion forms part of the *Decretum*, which served as a central resource in the instruction


37 Couliano (as in note 7).


of ecclesiastical law until the twentieth century). Its author held that followers of the Devil were to be punished severely, but specified that:

Some wicked women, perverted by the Devil, seduced by illusions and phantasm of demons (daemonum illusionibus et phantasmatisbus seductae), believe and profess themselves, in the hours of the night, to ride upon certain beasts with Diana, the goddess of pagans, and an innumerable multitude of women, and in the silence of the night to traverse great spaces of earth. ... Satan himself ... when he has captured the mind of a miserable woman and has subjugated her to his visage by infidelity and incredulity, immediately transforms himself into the species and similitudes of different personages and deludes the mind which he holds captive ... the faithless mind thinks these things happen not in the spirit but in the body. Who is there that is not led out of himself in dreams and nocturnal visions, and sees much when sleeping which he had never seen waking?

The reference to dream imagery is fascinating. Nocturnal transvection was only as a dream—a demented dream, by virtue of its agent, Satan, but a dream nonetheless. In his *Formicarius* («Ant-heaps», 1437), the fifth book of which treats the nature and practice of witchcraft, the Dominican theologian Johannes Nider reports the case of a «quite demented woman» who believed herself to fly at night with Diana. Eager to prove her transport, in Nider’s presence she smeared ointment into her skin, whereupon she fell into a deep slumber. In this

account as in many similar cases cited by later authors, the woman in question insisted upon waking that she had traveled far and wide, only to be disabused of this notion by the diligent observer who could attest to the fact that she had not left the room in which she had slept. No doubt she too was «seduced by illusions and phantasm of demons» visible to her under the cover of sleep.

Mental images—dreams and, more generally, figurines of the imagination—are repeatedly invoked in the profoundly influential fifteenth-century manual, the *Malleus Maleficarum*, whose authors speak in some anatomical detail of their production: «The apparitions that come in dreams to sleepers proceed from the ideas retained in the repository of the mind, through a natural local motion caused by a flow of blood to the first and inmost seal of their faculties of perception.» It is further specified that this motion can be effected by devils, even in people who are awake. «For in these also the devils can stir up and excite the inner perceptions and humors so that ideas retained in the repositories of their minds are drawn out and made apparent to the faculties of fancy and the imagination, so that such men imagine these things to be true. And this is called interior temptation.» Such arguments as are made in the *Malleus*, for example, depend on classical and post-classical physiologies of perception to a remarkable (if largely unremarked) degree.

Where they survey the topography of the «faculties of perception» Krämer and Sprenger seem to support the view that witchcraft consists of the excitement of the faculties of fancy and of imagination (phantasia), and that it takes the form of mental apparitions—of images.

Demons, according to Krämer and Sprenger, are adept at making «impressions on the inner faculties corresponding to the bodily organs.» The Devil rearranges images in the victim’s mind, transplanting them from the memory (which is in the back part of the head) to the imagination (in the middle part of the head) and, finally, to the faculty of reason (in the front of the head). The result? Vexation, and a misplaced belief in the actuality of what is seen: «He causes such a sudden change and confusion, that such objects [as he presents] are necessarily thought to be actual things seen with the eyes.» It has very plausibly


Kons and Peters (as in note 41), pp. 29-31. See also Henry Charles Lea, *Materials Toward a History of Witchcraft*, ed. by Arthur C. Howland, 3 vols., Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1939, vol. 1, pp. 178-181 and, on the influence of the *Canon Episcopi* on theological treatments of witchcraft through the sixteenth century, pp. 181-198; and Edward Peters, *The Magician, the Witch and the Law*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978, pp. 71-78. This text was assembled by Regino, formerly Abbot of Prüm, ca. 906, when asked by the archbishop of Trier to produce a manual of ecclesiastical discipline; the portion cited, which is endlessly cited in literature on early modern witchcraft, may date to the ninth century. The text was then included in Gratian’s *Decretum* (ca. 1140).


44 See Lea (as in note 42), vol. 1, pp. 260-265. The *Formicarius* was first published in 1475, forty years after its completion; the original location and exact date are unknown.

45 Nider, *Formicarius*, Book 2, chapter iv, as cited by Lea (as in note 42), vol. I, p. 177. Even de Lancy cites a case in *De Lancy* (as in note 40), Book 2, chapter 1, pp. 187-188, where he cites Luther and Melanchthon as proponents of the falsehoods contained in the *Canon Episcopi*.


been suggested that the prevalence of this view of mental phantasms in early modern demonology is indebted to Aquinas' support of Platonic notions. Indeed, much of what Aquinas, picking up on Aristotle's De Anima as well as on Platonic readings, has to say about supernatural influences on the imagination and dreams is relevant. A demon, he writes, can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise than it is....49 And, quoting Augustine, he writes:

«Man's imagination, which, whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things, appears to other men's senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal. ... the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's senses.»

The devil is not just an artist, but a cinematographer as well. More to the point, though, the terms of these descriptions of the faculty of the imagination are entirely in keeping with renaissance theories of artistic creativity. Like many of their followers, Krämer and Sprenger were inclined to argue that witchcraft's status as illusion did not vitiate its reality, or its agents' culpability. The Ambrosian friar Francesco Maria Guazzo, writing in 1608, concluded that:

witches sometimes are actually present at the Sabbath; and often again they are fast asleep at home, and yet think that they are at the Sabbath; for the devil deceives their senses, and through his illusions many imaginings may enter the minds of sleepers, leaving them with a conviction of their reality when they awake, as if it were not a dream but an actual experience and an uncoupled physical action.50

Whether their travels were mere illusions or not, these women were held responsible for them; the mechanism of dreaming, however simply construed,

«cell doctrines» of brain function, derived largely from Augustine, held that the first cell (third ventricle) was the seat of imagination, fantasy, and reasoning; the third cell (fourth ventricle) was the seat of memory; the fourth cell was the seat of the soul. See Bundy (as in note 4), and Wier (as in note 36), «Memorative Function of the Brain», [Glossen], pp. 728-729.

49 Bundy (as in note 4), p. 222.


Eyes wide shut
was the common ground Guazzo (and others) referred to in order to substantiate claims for the culpability of the deceived.

Witchcraft as an image

In the hands of skeptics in opposition to such authors as Krämer and Sprenger and Guazzo, the faculty of imagination was a key to the acquittal of witches. Witchcraft was just an image; it was but a dream. In a chapter of his De praestigiis daemonum called «Concerning the Imagination and how it is Impaired», Jan Wier cites Neoplatonic sources at some length to buttress his argument that witchcraft amounts to a figment of the imagination. He quotes the Florentine philosopher, philologist, and physician Marsilio Ficino (1433 – 1499), for example:

The imagination expresses the activities of reason under the condition of sensible things, and it can produce phantasms far beyond the activities of the senses. It surpasses sensation, because by producing images without external stimulation, it is like Proteus or the chameleon.52

Earlier in this section of his study, Wier had refuted the actuality of the pact purportedly made between witches and the devil. In Book 3, chapter iii, he writes:

52 Wier (as in note 36), pp. 186-187. Wier also cited Ficino's discussion, in The Platonic Theology, XIII, i, of the impression of images on the fetus of a pregnant woman; and he paraphrases Iamblichus on the same page. «The imagination is naturally joined to all the powers of the soul, and it shapes and fashions likenesses and apparitions of all external forms, and it carries over the sights or impressions of one set of powers to another, forming a notion or opinion from the impressions which flicker forth from the senses.» It is fascinating that Guazzo, writing four decades later, opens his Compendium Maleficarum — a relatively fierce condemnation of witches — with a chapter called «The Nature and Extent of the Force of Imagination», the first sentences of which reads, «Many authors have written at length concerning the force of imagination: for example Pico della Mirandola, De Imaginacionibus; Marsilio Ficino, De Theologia Platonica, Book 13; Alonso Tostado, On Genesis, Chapter 30; Miguel de Medina, De Rafael en Dona Flora, II, 77; Leonard Vais, De Ficino, II, 3, and countless others. All are agreed that the imagination is a most potent force; and both by argument and by experience they prove that a man's or woman's body may be most extensively affected by his imagination. For they argue that as the imagination examines the images of objects perceived by the senses, it excites in the appetitive faculty either fear or shame or anger or sorrow; and these emotions so affect a man with heat or cold that his body either grows pale or reddens, and he consequently becomes joyous and exultant, or torpid and depressed.» Guazzo (as in note 51), Book 1, chapter 1, 1.
We can clearly recognize that the pact is illusory and that it is fabricated and confirmed by the deceptive appearance of a phantasm, or a fancy of the mind or the phantastical body of a blinding spirit. ... The deception [of the pact] occurs either when an apparition of Satan's choice is cunningly imposed upon the optic or visual nerves by the disturbing of the appropriate humors and spirits, or when a whistling, or whispering, or murmuring, corresponding in form to the corrupt image, is aroused in the organs of hearing by the evil spirit's art ... 53

Wier's refutation of the actuality of what he identifies as deceptive phantasms or apparitions imposed on the visual apparatus of the devil's victims begs to be read in light of the image debate, which in the 1560s—at the time he was writing his treatise in Cleve—gave rise to what were arguably the most turbulent events outside witch trials and executions in the neighboring regions. In this context, it would appear that Wier's account of the power of images internalizes (and demonizes) Protestant critique of the effects of images. It might even be read as an extension of the Lutheran specification on the dangers of images: «The problem is not the matter [i.e., what is represented] but the use and abuse of things.»54 That such images as witchcraft can occur in the mind is not in question; after all, as even the Canon episcopi argued, we all experience images in our dreams. The use and abuse of the image-producing mechanisms we all share is what divides us from good from bad.

Theories of phantasia and imagination tended to feature built-in controls on the power of this faculty. Plato argued that on the one hand the distance of phantasmata from the realm of ideas diminished their significance; phantasia was also, to his taste, too closely allied with appetite and passions and thereby subject to distortion. Distortion becomes a quality of the perceived phantasmata as much as it is a failing of the faculty of phantasia. In a famous passage, Plato likens the relation between the material world and its phantastie representation to the difference between objects seen out of and immersed in water:

And the same objects appear straight when looked at out of the water, and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colors to which sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the human mind on which

53 «The Profusion made by the Lamiae is Refuted, and the Pact is Shown to be Deceptive, Foolish, and of no Weight», Wier/Mora (as in note 36), p. 173.
54 «Non est disputatio de substantia, sed usus et abusus rerum.» Martin Luther, Werke, XXVIII: 554.

the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic.55

«That weakness of the human mind»—a weakness that made one vulnerable to conjuring, deception, or illusion—would come, in Christian contexts, to be theorized as a weakness on which the devil himself could and did prey. Aquinas posits that a certain dislocation or dissociation of the faculties made them particularly receptive to supernatural phantasms, where he writes that:

The soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions.56

Or, the sleep of reason permits the incursion of demonic phantasms. As Wier puts it, very generally, «Persons who stray from common sense are sometimes popularly said to be imagining things, and their distortion of understanding or reason or thought is termed their imagination.»57 Intellect or reason, depending on who is writing, functions as a bridle which, when loosened, gives free rein to the imagination. This state of affairs is particularly congenial to the devil.

The social order of phantasia

In what is perhaps the most potent and certainly one of the liveliest of sixteenth-century discussions of the imagination, an essay titled «On the Force of the Imagination», Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) remarks that:

It is probable that the belief in miracles, vision, enchantments, and such extraordinary occurrences springs in the main from the power of the imagination acting principally on the minds of the common people, who are the more easily impressed. Their beliefs have been so strongly captured that they think they see what they do not.58

While Montaigne's essay deals largely with the force of the imagination on the body and specifically with cases of physical ailments, from impotence to stigmat- mat: to stones, the social implications of his remarks on the belief in preternat-

55 Republic, bk. VI, 602 C. D. See Bundy (as in note 4), pp. 24, 30.
56 Aquinas, Summa (as in note 40), pp. 214–215.
57 Wier (as in note 36), Book 3, chapter XV, p. 213.
oral occurrences are clear. The relation of imagination to social order is also at stake in early modern conceptions of artistic imagination or *phantasia* — though generally in a positive sense. In this regard, we might say that the powers of the imagination that Montaigne and Hobbes warn against, as capable of effecting illusions, are precisely the powers artists seek to claim, in the name of creative power. Cennini, Leonardo, and Dürer, among others, based claims for the elevated status of the visual arts on the faculty of artistic *phantasia*. The creative agency of fantasy was claimed, heftily, to be shared by poets and painters. It also served as a keystone in burgeoning arguments for the autonomy of and respect due to the art of painting. Because painting *demands* fantasy and skill of hand ... it rightly deserves to be seated at the rank of science, and to be crowned together with poetry*, wrote Cennini. The equation of quasi-divine creativity (productive fantasia) with new claims to esteem is central to Dürer's prescriptions for the respect due artists; the *most understanding artists are similar to God.* Elsewhere, he writes of the artists capacity to generate new forms, *which none had before seen or imagined. God therefore in such and other ways grants great power unto artistic men.* Leonardo expresses the relation between fantasy and social rank variously; it is vividly internalized and potent where he refers to the painter as *lord and god* (*signor e dio*) of his own creations. Keith Moxey has convincingly demonstrated that Hieronymus Bosch's *enigmatic forms were the product of fantasy* and the world upside down he represented amounted to an instantiation of inversion vindicated by humanist valuation of fantasia. If the realm of the imagination was the locus of potentially unruly creations (from Bosch's hybrid creatures to Hobbes's centaurs and the *satyrs, fawns, nymphs* of the *religion of the Gentiles in time past*), artistic access to that domain and the capacity or skill of hand to generate forms from it guaranteed the social status of the artist. Needless to say, one of the realms of artistic interest to which this essay alludes throughout is the representation of demonic subject matter — witches in particular. One way to account for early modern artistic investment in the production of images of the fantastic figures of demonology might, consequently, be by considering the extent to which the capacity to do so would have been construed as a form of control over the faculty of *phantasia* — a faculty or agency that was as troubling as it was potentially ennobling.

60 Summers (as in note 23), pp. 132-133; see esp. note 93.
61 Cennini (as in note 31), chapter 1.
63 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 183.